European Economic Community-Community Law-National Economic Measures-In The Economic Sectors Governed By A Common Market Organization, Especially When Such An Organization Rests On A Common Pricing System, The Member States May Not Intervene Unilaterally By Means Of Internal Provisions In The Process Of Price Formation Determined By The Common Organization by Hooks, Harold L, Jr
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY-COMMUNITY LAW-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC MEASURES-IN THE ECONOMIC SECTORS Gov-
ERNED BY A COMMON MARKET ORGANIZATION, ESPECIALLY WHEN SUCH
AN ORGANIZATION RESTS ON A COMMON PRICING SYSTEM, THE MEMBER
STATES MAY NOT INTERVENE UNILATERALLY BY MEANS OF INTERNAL
PROVISIONS IN THE PROCESS OF PRICE FORMATION DETERMINED BY THE
COMMON ORGANIZATION.
During the summer of 1973, Italy faced severe economic problems. In an
attempt to stem the adverse effects of large balance-of-payments deficits,
the devaluation of the lira, inflation, and unemployment, the Italian
Government invoked emergency powers, provided for in the Italian Consti-
tution, I which enabled the Executive to enact restrictive measures of statu-
tory force. Decree-Law 425 of July 24, 19732 regulated the prices of goods
produced and distributed in large-scale undertakings.' Signor Filippo
Galli, an Italian merchant trading in cereals and oilseed flour, was charged
before the Pretura Unificata of Rome with having violated Decree-Law
425.1 In his defense Galli pointed out that the products in question were
subject to regulations' enacted by the Council of the European Economic
Community. Galli argued that Decree-Law 425 did not apply in his case,
not only because the Decree itself excluded from its scope goods covered
by other legislation (a point of internal law), but also because a national
regulation of prices of agricultural products is incompatible with the EEC
Treaty and, specifically, with the existing regulations on the common or-
ganization of the agricultural markets in question. Although Galli's de-
fense was founded primarily upon the exclusion proviso in the Decree
' CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ITALY art. 77 (1948).
2 [19731 La Legislazione Italiana (Giuffr6) 2381. Also enacted on July 24, 1973 were
Decree-Law 426, id. at 2383, controlling rents of urban premises, and Decree-Law 427, id. at
2384, regulating the prices of certain basic consumer goods. Filippo Galli, [19751 1 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 211, 214 (submissions of the Advocate General). A summary of recent economic
developments in Italy appears in Doing Business in Europe, CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 25,621
(1975).
Decree-Law 425 required enterprises producing or distributing goods sold by weight,
measurement or quantity, the turnover of which exceeded five billion lire in the first half of
1973, to submit to the Interministerial Price Commission (CIP) a list of prices charged for
their goods on June 28, 1973. Further, until June 30, 1974, any alteration in those prices was
to have been preceded by a notice to the CIP. The proposed price change would take effect
60 days after such notification, unless prohibited by the appropriate Minister. The Decree
exempted from the notification requirement those enterprises producing or distributing goods
whose prices were subject to another regulation. Filippo Galli, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
211, 215 (submissions of the Advocate General).
' Galli was charged with three offenses: (1) failure to submit a list of prices charged by his
company for certain cereals; (2) in respect to certain exports of flour, the submission of prices
different from those charged on July 28, 1973; and (3) the invoicing of flour at prices higher
than those shown on the list submitted to the CIP.
Regulation 120/67, the common organization of the market in cereals, and Regulation
136/66, the common organization of the market in fats and oil. 1 A. CAMPBELL, COMMON
MARKET LAW xxxi (1969) (table of regulations).
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itself, the Pretore of Rome, deciding that important questions of Com-
munity law were also at issue, referred Galli's case to the Court of Justice
of the European Communities for a preliminary ruling as provided for
under article 177 of the EEC Treaty.6 Held, in the sectors7 governed by a
common market organization-a fortiori when it rests on a common pricing
system-the Member States may not intervene by unilateral acts in the
system of price formation laid down by the common organization. Filippo
Galli, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 211.
Article 189 of the EEC Treaty' empowers the Council of the Community
to issue regulations, in accordance with provisions of the Treaty, that are
directly applicable and binding in every respect in each Member State.
In Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Oberelbe v. Firma Paul G. Bollman, ° the
Court of Justice held that to the extent that the Member States have
transferred law-making powers in a specific area to the Community, they
no longer have such powers in that area. As a corollary, the Member States
are prohibited, in the execution of provisions to implement Community
legislation, from adopting measures designed to alter the scope or amplify
' Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done March 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 (unofficial English version) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty]. The Treaty may
also be found in 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 151 (1973). Article 177 of the EEC Treaty
provides:
The Court of Justice shall be competent to make a preliminary decision (titre
prejudiciel) concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Com-
munity;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of any bodies set up by an act of the
Council, where such statutes so provide.
Where any such question is raised before a court or tribunal of one of the Member
States, such court or tribunal may, if it considers that its judgment depends on a
preliminary decision on this question, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling
thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a domestic court or
tribunal from whose decision no appeal lies under municipal law, such court or
tribunal shall refer the matter to the Court of Justice.
The Court of Justice restricted its holding somewhat by stating that where, as in the cases
of corn and fats, the common pricing system applies exclusively to the phases of production
and wholesale trade, the Member States therefore remain free-subject to other provisions
of the EEC Treaty-to regulate prices at the retail and consumer level, so long as they do
not thereby endanger the objectives and working of the common market organization in
question. Filippo Galli, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 211, 229.
Note 6 supra.
The term "directly applicable" refers to the concept that Community regulations should
be automatically incorporated into the law of each Member State, without being subjected
to the normal process of incorporation under the constitutional law of that State. Filippo
Galli, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 211, 219 (submissions of the Advocate General). See
Winter, Direct Applicability and Direct Effect: Two Distinct and Different Concepts in
Community Law, 9 C.M.L. REV. 425, 435-36 (1972).
0o [1970] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 141; accord, Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen v. Bremer Han-
delsgesellschaft GmbH, [19701 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 466.
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the provisions of the Community regulations themselves." However, before
Filippo Ga li the Court of Justice had never extended this "division of
powers" reasoning so far as to say that the existence of a common organiza-
tion 2 of the market for a certain product precludes intervention of the
Member States, by national legislation, in the market for that product."
On the contrary, in Riseria Luigi Geddo v. Ente Nazionale Risi,4 despite
the existence of a common organization for the rice market, the Court of
Justice did not apply the "division of powers" rationale to invalidate an
Italian internal tax on domestic transactions in rice which was designed
to provide funds to aid national production in that sector, although such
a domestic provision quite likely would have been held invalid had it
directly reduced the benefits provided by the Community regulations in
that market. Also, the judgment of the Court of Justice in Offizier Van
Justitie v. Van Haaster" suggests that a regulation creating a common
market organization should be carefully scrutinized before it is held that
a certain national measure in the same sector is invalid. 16
The Community regulations invoked by Signor Galli in his defense-
Corn Marketing Regulation 120/67 and Fats Marketing Regulation
136/6617-are measures adopted by the Council of the European Economic
Community for the purpose of creating common organizations for those
markets within the meaning of article 401 of the EEC Treaty. When, in
July 1967, Regulation 120/67 established uniform grain prices throughout
the Community, the Community grain market reached the culmination of
" That secondary principle has been applied in three cases, all of which were cited in the
argument on behalf of Signor Galli. In NV Granaria Graaninkoopmaatschappij v. Produkts-
chap voor Veevoeder, 1973 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 596, the Court of Justice declared Dutch domes-
tic provisions exempting an importer from a Council-imposed levy to be incompatible with
the division of powers between the Member State and the Community. In State v. Grosoli,
[1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 40, it was held that the Community organs alone have the power
to determine the economic use to which Community tariff quotas must be put, the Court
thereby restricting the scope of some Italian administrative arrangements. Finally, in
Hannoversche Zucker AG Rethen-Weetzen v. Hauptzollamt Hannover, COURT DECISIONS,
CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8263 (transfer binder 1974), it was held that the common organiza-
tion of the sugar market forms a comprehensive system and that any omissions therein cannot
be remedied by the Member States in accordance with their national laws.
2 According to article 40 of the EEC Treaty, supra note 6, the "common organization" of
an agricultural market may take one of three forms, depending on the product involved: (1)
the application of common rules of competition, (2) the mandatory coordination of the Mem-
ber States' individual market organizations, or (3) the creation of a uniform European market
organization. Invariably, the European market organization has been the form adopted.
" Filippo Galli, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 211, 216 (submissions of the Advocate Gen-
eral).
" [19741 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 13.
'* [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 521.
* Filippo Galli, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 211, 216-17 (submissions of the Advocate
General).
17 References cited note 5 supra.
" See note 12 supra.
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common organization, the single market stage,'" in which all customs ob-
stacles to the free trade in grain and related products at the internal
frontiers of the EEC were dissolved. The creation of a single grain market
provides the Community with an integrated policy with respect to grain
trade with the outside world. Regulation 136/66 has created a common
organization 0 for the market in oils and fats, although, due to the nature
and productivity of some crops in that market, integration has not pro-
ceeded to the same extent as in the grain sector. Within the oil and fats
organization, a system of prices was imposed solely for those products more
susceptible to price fluctuations, particularly olive oil. Other products in
the market are merely subject to customs protection from outside trade
and safeguards in situations of market disturbance.2 Both regulations
serve to implement, in their respective markets, the general mandate of
article 2 of the EEC Treaty 2 as well as the more specific provisions of
article 9,23 establishing a customs union, and article 30,1 prohibiting im-
port quotas between Member States.
Besides the basic provisions concerning implementation of the above
rudimentary articles of the EEC Treaty, regulations creating common
market organizations will normally prescribe what the conduct of the Com-
munity institutions and Member States shall be in the case of a market
disturbance, such as a rise in prices on the world market. Even at the single
market stage of the grain sector, Regulation 120/67 provides a complex of
safeguard measures25 which require joint action by the Community institu-
tions and the individual Member States, as well as the services of a perma-
nent Management Committee for Grain, composed of representatives of
the Member States. Regulation 136/66 provides a similar system for the
oil and fats sector.26 The operation of such multilateral procedures is an
important factor contributing to the realization of the common agricul-
" 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 438 (1973).
2. Id. 860.
21 Filippo Galli, [19751 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 211, 228.
2 Note 6 supra. Article 2 states:
It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a Common Market and
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a
continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability, an accelerated raising
of the standard of living and closer relations between its Member States.
2 Note 6 supra. Article 9, paragraph 1 states:
The Community shall be based upon a customs union covering the exchange of
all goods and comprising both the prohibition, as between Member States, of cus-
toms duties on importation and exportation and all charges with equivalent effect
and the adoption of a common customs tariff in their relations with third countries.
20 Note 6 supra. Article 30 provides: "Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures
with equivalent effect shall, without prejudice to the following provisions, hereby be prohib-
ited as between Member States."
20 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 438 (1973).
21 Id. 860.
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tural policy"7 of the Community.
In Filippo Galli, the Court of Justice initially directed its attention to
the exclusive system of grain prices created by Corn Marketing Regula-
tion 120/67, concluding that "any national rules producing distortions
in the process of price formation as developed in the context of the
Community rules in the sector will be incompatible with the regulation." 8
Analyzing the complex of arrangements provided in Regulation 120/67 to
cope with "unpromising tendencies appearing in the movement of
prices," 9 the Court found that the measures allowing prompt joint initia-
tives by the Member States and Community organs preclude unilateral
intervention by a Member State. 30 Noting that the common organization
of the oil and fats market created by Fats Marketing Regulation 136/66 has
not reached the stage involving a complete Community system of price
formation, the Court nevertheless remarked that even the mere existence
of a common market organization within the meaning of article 401, pre-
cludes the enactment of national provisions capable of hindering intra-
Community trade in that sector. In conclusion, the Court of Justice held
that a national system such as that created by the Italian Decree-Law
425, 3 which, by subjecting prices to various administrative blocks and
controls, alters the process of price formation determined by the common
market organization, is incompatible with Regulations 120/67 and 136/66
and with the general prohibition in article 5 that the Member States must
Article 39, paragraph 1 of the EEC Treaty, supra note 6, states that the objectives of
the common agricultural policy shall be:
(a) to increase agricultural productivity by developing technical progress and by
ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the opti-
mum utilisation of the factors of production, particularly labour;
(b) to ensure thereby a fair standard of living for the agricultural population,
particularly by the increasing of the individual earnings of persons engaged in
agriculture;
(c) to stabilise markets;
(d) to guarantee regular supplies; and
(e) to ensure reasonable prices in supplies to consumers.
2 [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 227. The Court of Justice found that "[the freedom of
intra-Community trade is guaranteed by the regulation through a complex of provisions
aimed at eliminating both the obstacles to free circulation and all distortions in intra-
Community trade arising out of intervention on the markets of the Member-States in forms
not provided for in the regulation itself." Id.
29 Id. at 228.
' The Court considered whether such unilateral intervention by a Member State might
be justified by reference to article 103 of the EEC Treaty, supra note 6, which makes it clear
that "business cycle" policy, or that based on recurrent booms and slumps in business
activity, is not a common policy of the Community, but rather a policy of each of the Member
States. 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 3602 (1965). The Court held, however, that article 103 is
concerned only with the short-term economic policy of the Member States and, therefore,
does not apply to those sectors which have already become common, including, of course, the
organization of the agricultural markets. 1975 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 228.
' Note 12 supra.
32 [1973] La Legislazione Italians (Giuffr6) 2381; see note 3 supra.
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"abstain from any measures which could jeopardize the attainment" of the
objectives of the Treaty. 3 Consequently, the Court agreed with Signor
Galli that "[i]ndividuals, subject to the Community regulations, cannot
therefore be required to observe any unilateral measures adopted by the
States . . . . 3
The Court's statement as to the rights of individuals subject to Regula-
tions 120/67 and 136/66 reveals a most crucial aspect of the ruling on the
primacy of those regulations over national measures in the sectors in-
volved. Filippo Galli affirms that the regulations in question confer upon
the citizens of Member States individual rights which must be recognized
in the national courts of the Community-a much litigated concept of
Community law known as "direct effect."3 5 The Advocate General 3 who
presented submissions to the Court in Filippo Gali had argued against
"direct effect" for the two regulations. Citing the tests for "direct effect"
previously laid down by the Court-that the Community provisions in
question be clear, unconditional and in need of no further legislative action
for their implementation 37-the Advocate General concluded (1) that the
adoption of Regulations 120/67 and 136/66 did not preclude national legis-
lation on prices, (2) that any such legislation must be compatible with the
Community regulations, and (3) that, in general, it is for the EEC authori-
ties, not individuals, to enforce this requirement of compatibility. 3 Realiz-
ing that a consequence of the adoption of his view might be the prosecution
EEC Treaty, supra note 6.
31 [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 229.
' For discussion of the "direct effect" of Community law see P. PESCATORE, THE LAW OF
INTEGRATION 92-106 (1974); R. LAUWAARS, LAWFULNESS AND LEGAL FORCE OF COMMUNITY
DECISIONS 14-26 (1973); Winter, Direct Applicability and Direct Effect: Two Distinct and
Different Concepts in Community Law, 9 C.M.L. REV. 425 (1972).
3' Article 166 of the EEC Treaty, supra note 6, provides that the Court of Justice "shall be
assisted by two advocates-general," who shall be charged with the duty "to present publicly,
with complete impartiality and independence, reasoned conclusions on cases submitted to
the Court of Justice, with a view to assisting the latter in the performance of its duties .... "
Possessing the same qualifications as the members of the Court, the Advocates General are
not bound to safeguard the interests of any party to the proceedings, of any Community
institutions, or of the general public. Like the Court, they are to be guided only by the law,
not by policy considerations or reasons of expediency. The Court may agree or disagree with
the legal position taken by the Advocate General, although in a majority of cases the Court
has followed the reasoning presented in the submissions. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 4608
(1965).
37 Filippo Galli, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 211, 219 (submissions of the Advocate Gen-
eral); see Gemeenschappelijke Verzekeringskas 'De Sociale Voorzorg' v. Bertholet, [19661
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 191.
Filippo Galli, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 211, 219 (submissions of the Advocate Gen-
eral). The Advocate General did restrict his conclusion somewhat by stating that insofar as
the requirement of compatibility prevents Member States from prescribing maximum prices
lower than prices set by Community organs, Regulation 120/67 may confer rights on private
persons which national courts must uphold. Id. The reader is reminded that 120/67 does
embody a much more comprehensive system of pricing than does 136/66. See notes 19-21
supra, and accompanying text.
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and conviction of citizens of the Member States under national price con-
trols subsequently shown to be invalid as a result of actions by the EEC
authorities, the Advocate General suggested that "in the field of price
control, people can flout their national laws, in reliance on Community
law, only at their own risk."39 However, finding that Regulations 120/67
and 136/66 preempt national legislation in those sectors, the Court of Jus-
tice chose not to leave the individual citizen at the mercy of unilateral
national measures and perhaps slow and cumbersome enforcement proce-
dures on the part of the Community institutions. In unequivocal language
the Court stated that "[iun the market sectors in issue those regulations
guarantee, with direct effect in favor of individuals, the free circulation of
goods ... .40 By affirming that Regulations 120/67 and 136/66 confer
personal rights upon the citizens of the Member States which must be
upheld by national courts, the Court of Justice may have prevented unfair
legal complications for those merchants relying upon the pricing mecha-
nisms those measures provide. Also, the possibility of aggressive legal ac-
tions by individuals subject to the regulations presents a useful supple-
ment to the official EEC enforcement procedures.
The judgment of the European Court of Justice in Filippo Galli provides
an important example of what Pierre Pescatore, a noted scholar and mem-
ber of the Court, has called the "really original innovation of the Treaties
of Rome," a direct relationship between judicial powers." The drafters of
the EEC Treaty provided for the inevitable conflicts between Community
law and domestic law by including the concept of preliminary rulings by
the Court.42 Pescatore concludes that this sharing of "the exercise of the
judicial office . . . between the Community level and the national level"
creates "an integrating effect, the scope and depth of which experience
alone can measure. 43 The nature of this integrating effect comes into full
view in the Filippo Galli judgment, in which the Court furthers the task
of creating a common legal basis for the Community by declaring the
primacy of Community law over national measures in those economic sec-
tors subject to a common market organization. Such a legal consensus will
provide the Community leadership with the necessary flexibility to pursue
total economic union.
Harold LeVaughn Hooks, Jr.
3' Filippo Galli, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 211, 220 (submissions of the Advocate Gen-
eral).
Filippo Galli, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 211, 229 (emphasis added).
" PESCATORE, supra note 35, at 91.
, See note 6 supra.
"' PESCATORE, supra note 35, at 91.
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